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Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) such as 
Blockchain have been heralded for their potential to fun-
damentally disrupt traditional industries and longstand-
ing practices in private and public businesses. In the fi-
nancial sectors, for example, quite a number of novel fi-
nancial technology (FinTech) services based on 
DLT/Blockchain have been introduced with cryptocur-
rencies representing prominent cases. While the already 
highly regulated financial sectors have emerged as early 
targets for DLT/Blockchain induced disruption, a diverse 
set of other areas, such as healthcare record keeping, in-
surance record keeping, industrial and retail supply 
chain management, property registries, citizen identifi-
cation systems, and voting systems to name a few, has 
also come into the focus of DLT/Blockchain innovation. 
These new types of services might be in need of both com-
plementary and novel regulations for DLT/Blockchain-
based services. Interestingly, smaller jurisdictions such 
as Gibraltar, Malta, and Liechtenstein were among the 
first to provide advice and regulation for DLT/Block-
chain service provisions. The study compares these early 
regulatory approaches to each other and discusses the 
prospects of DLT/Blockchain service regulation based on 
the study’s findings. DLT/Blockchain service regulation 
appears to incorporate predominantly principle-based 
rather than rule-based regulations, which makes the reg-
ulation enforcement a uniquely individual case-based 
task. 
1. Introduction  
Initially, when Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) 
debuted in the first decade of the 21st century its overall 
disruptive potential remained widely uncovered. Only 
with the advent and success of cryptocurrencies, which 
are based on Blockchain, a DLT implementation, the 
unique and broad capabilities of the technology became 
more widely understood [28]. Post-hoc non-falsifiability 
or immutability of transactional records, security of 
transactions in an append-only ledger-type environment, 
transparency of transactions, and reduction of transaction 
costs as a result of the former three characteristics were 
among the distinguishing capabilities of 
DLT/Blockchain [14, 22, 25, 28, 31]. Moreover, via smart 
contracts based on predefined algorithms DLT-based 
transactions could be automatically executed in case the 
contractual conditions were satisfied, which would further 
drive down transaction costs and speed up the transac-
tional process. In the financial sector, the implications of 
cryptocurrencies and also smart contracting were quickly 
understood also with regard to their quality to eliminate 
the need for services from central counterparties such as 
banks [14]. 
Forced by the success of unregulated cryptocurrencies 
and other DLT-based financial technology (FinTech) ser-
vices, which had grown to a sizable global economic entity 
by the mid of the second decade of the 21st century, law-
makers and regulators around the world began to investi-
gate the options for regulating the novel phenomena for 
reasons of gaining control over DLT-based money flows 
(in terms of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist fi-
nancing interests) as well as for establishing baseline se-
curity and protection for investors and investments [3, 7, 
19, 21, 24, 34]. 
While large jurisdictions such as the Federal Govern-
ment of the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU) as well as other nation states have either taken a case-
by-case approach like the US, or have been intentionally 
slow in deliberating, crafting, and agreeing on explicit 
overall DLT service-related regulations, a few smaller ju-
risdictions such as Gibraltar, a self-governed overseas ter-
ritory of the United Kingdom (UK), the EU member state 
of Malta, and more recently the EU associate Principality 
of Liechtenstein have moved more quickly towards formal 
hearings on proposed DLT service-related legislation and 
regulation. Finally, in quick succession respective regula-
tions went into effect in 2018 in Gibraltar and Malta. We 
would have liked to include the also self-governed British 
island of Bermuda in this study. While we collected com-
prehensive documentation on Bermuda’s regulation of 
DLT-related service provisions, we were unable to per-
suade any of Bermuda’s stakeholders to be part of this 
study as interviewees, which prevented arriving at a multi-
stakeholder perspective on the nature of the regulation, its 
motivations and expectations along with other clarifica-
tions and interpretations of the regulatory effort in the case 






of Bermuda. Therefore, we finally refrained from includ-
ing the case in this project. 
This study explores the nature of the respective regu-
lations, their objectives and expectations as seen by reg-
ulators, as well as their effects on DLT service providers. 
In comparing the early regulation attempts and their al-
ready observable effects the study aims at better under-
standing the regulatory choices and challenges as well as 
the potentially enabling and constraining outcomes of 
various regulatory approaches on DLT-based services. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, the aca-
demic literature on DLT/Blockchain provider regulation 
is reviewed followed by a presentation of the resulting 
research questions and the methodology section. Subse-
quently, the study findings are detailed leading to the 
discussion of insights from the findings. At last, conclu-
sions are drawn, and the directions for future research on 
the subject are sketched out.  
2. Literature Review 
The academic literature on the regulation of 
DLT/Blockchain providers and service provision is still 
relatively small. While the term “regulation” itself has 
received different interpretations [21], in which some 
authors relate to a fixed set of hard rules, the compliance 
to which requires adequate enforcement, others see in 
regulation the willful causation of desirable behavior 
within certain boundaries. Some debate has ensued re-
garding the appropriateness of legal and/or regulatory 
provisions for technology itself rather than for the fram-
ing of productive uses of technology and for preventing 
harmful ones. Digital technology, it has been argued, de-
velops too fast and changes too quickly such that any 
regulatory efforts targeted at the technology itself and its 
specificities might be outright ineffective, be outdated 
quickly, or even have undesirable and stifling side ef-
fects on the technological progress [21]. In that context, 
Moses quotes Eastbrook’s 1996 argument, in which the 
judge refers exempli gratia to an imaginary “Law of the 
Horse,” which would be impossible to effectively for-
mulate for sake of its endlessly enumerable instantia-
tions [21]. Furthermore, as Moses also holds, regulators 
face the twin hurdles, one of which is the so-called Col-
lingridge dilemma according to which in the early stage 
of digital technology evolution, any regulation would be 
highly speculative in the absence of unknowable out-
comes with or without regulation, while at a later stage 
with more mature new-technology uses the regulation 
might become overly disruptive to the evolved status-
quo [6]. The other hurdle is given by the “uncertainty 
paradox” according to which the assessment of risks re-
garding regulatory outcomes as opposed to those out-
comes under no regulation would be equally unknowa-
ble at the time of regulation [15]. 
In the rapidly evolving FinTech sector, novel uses 
based on DLT/Blockchain technology, for example, the 
creation of crypto-currencies and their trading on DLT-
based exchange platforms, have so far greatly outpaced 
undertakings to provide legal or regulatory frameworks 
[23]. Lastra & Allen point at the three border problems 
that any regulation of cyber services has to address: (a) 
the need for distinguishing the regulated from the unreg-
ulated activities and the so-called contagion problem in 
case of crossovers between the two realms, (b) the need 
for identifying the realm and reach of a regulation, which 
is enacted by a jurisdiction on national or sub-national  
levels, and (c) the need for identifying the realm and reach 
of a regulation, which pertains to services provided in cy-
berspace and the “real world” [20]. Three distinct areas 
of potential regulation have been identified, (a) virtual or 
crypto currencies, (b) initial coin offerings (ICOs) and 
crypto tokens, and (c) smart contracts [5]. 
Crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin and Ether have re-
ceived differential legal treatments from jurisdictions 
around the world, which range from strict prohibition 
over legally considering them assets or commodities rep-
resenting some exchange value all the way to regarding 
them as quasi-money, however, without legal tender sta-
tus [5, 12, 16, 17]. In the latter cases, globally well-estab-
lished frameworks such as anti-money laundering (AML) 
and combating financing terrorists (CFT) would apply 
also to these DLT/Blockchain-based services [12, 16].  
ICOs and crypto tokens have also been legally treated 
by jurisdictions in a similarly large range of ways from 
entire banning (China, South Korea) to considering them 
securities or commodities under existing laws on a case 
by case basis (US, Switzerland) to some regulation (Gi-
braltar, Canada), to not regulating them at all [5, 20]. 
Beyond the quasi-monetary or security-type instanti-
ations of crypto-currencies, academic accounts of regula-
tory needs have pointed at DLT service areas such as me-
dia of exchange, payment rails [20], and notarial, that is, 
non-monetary uses [14] such as document verification, 
authorship authentication, and contract enforcement [19] 
as well as title registries, licensing services, authentica-
tion/identity services, health insurance record keeping [1, 
4, 17], asset registries, application stacks, or other asset-
centric technologies [23] among others [14]. As Siegel 
outlines, digital tokens have four distinct characteristics: 
They may be either (a) fungible and transferable (for ex-
ample, like coupons or tickets, or (b) fungible and non-
transferable like club memberships or application ac-
counts, or (3) unique and transferable such as lottery tick-
ets or car titles, or (4) unique and non-transferable such 
as driver’s licenses or drug prescriptions [29]. Regulation 
of tokens and token-related services, hence, needs to ac-
count for these characteristics and use cases. 
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Smart contracts, tightly related to crypto-currencies, 
ICOs/tokens, represent another new realm and target of 
potential DLT-related service regulation. Smart con-
tracts typically embed algorithms in digital tokens, 
which under predefined conditions automatically exe-
cute legally binding transactions such as payments or 
transfer of ownership of digital assets. Regulatory ef-
forts and assessments need to clarify to what extent com-
mon law covers such algorithmic agreements, or in turn, 
comply with existing laws, or assume a legal standing 
on their own [5] 
Overall, regulation and licensure along all these lines 
are seen as enablers for DLT/Blockchain provision by 
decreasing legal risks for licensed providers and safety, 
fraud, and mishandling risks on part of service recipients 
[19]. 
However, as Zetsche et al [36] emphasize, whatever 
regulated DLT-based service is provided, legal liabili-
ties (and associated risk-related costs) will not vanish. 
Rather four dimensions of legal liability have to be con-
sidered in regulated DLT-based service provision, since 
these might be sources of risk proliferation: (1) liability 
as a result of breach of contract (for example, in a per-
missioned ledger between the partners), (2) liability re-
sulting from a partner’s control rights (again in permis-
sioned ledgers), (3) case-specific liability even in unper-
missioned ledgers, and (4) legal entanglement from joint 
liability when operating across jurisdictions with differ-
ent liability statutes. 
Furthermore, as Ramsay observes, DLT/Blockchain 
principles of operation and their regulation might create 
a Gordian legal knot when it comes to tension and out-
right conflict between (regulated) DLT/Blockchain ser-
vice provision and other regulations such as the EU’s 
latest General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 
2018 [24], the latter of which grants to individuals and 
institutions the per-request right to erasure, rectification, 
and restriction of processing of personal data, which 
would be a technically unfeasible task to perform on any 
permissionless distributed ledger and still a daunting one 
on permissioned distributed ledgers depending on the 
number of nodes.  
In summary, most of the legal and regulatory terri-
tory around DLT/Blockchain service provision, in gen-
eral, and around crypto-currencies, ICOs/tokens, and 
smart contracts, in particular, is uncharted, and, maybe 
even unchartable under a traditional regulatory ap-
proach. It also appears that in the absence of some level 
of regulatory harmonization on a global scale, 
DLT/Blockchain service provision might remain a risk-
heavy undertaking. Insofar, regulatory initiatives such 
as the ones investigated in this comparative study might 
help pave the path to the better understanding of 
challenges and opportunities of regulation in this area and 
its potential for legal harmonization. 
3. Research Questions 
This then leads to the following research questions: 
Research Question #1 (RQ#1): 
How do the investigated regulatory approaches com-
pare? 
Research Question #2 (RQ#2): 
 What are motivations and challenges for regulating 
DLT providers/provision at an early stage?  
Research Question #3 (RQ#3): 
 How are the identified challenges addressed in the 
various approaches of early regulations? 
4. Method Section  
Approach. Comparative case studies have been a pre-
ferred method of investigation, when the phenomena un-
der study were theoretically not yet well understood and 
the expected accumulation of knowledge rested on partic-
ular contexts [11] within real-life social settings [35]. By 
searching for motives, reasons, potential causes as well as 
for ways, means, and manners of actors’ relationships and 
actions within the phenomena under investigation the re-
sulting rich descriptive accounts in comparative case 
studies reach for theory development  or theory revision 
[9, 11, 35]. 
Instrument and Coding Scheme. The literature on 
regulatory benefits and challenges in the DLT/Block-
chain realm informed the development of a semi-struc-
tured interview protocol in four topical areas of (1) gen-
eral information, (2) perceptions of and motivations for 
DLT provider/provision regulation, (3) state of legislative 
and regulatory process, and (4) challenges and outlook 
within the broader context of DLT provider/provision 
regulation. The instrument incorporated a total of fifteen 
interview questions along with thirty anticipatory sub-
questions for further probing. 
Sample. After the British overseas territory Gibraltar 
had incorporated a worldwide first DLT provider/provi-
sion regulation in early 2018, which was studied sepa-
rately, the jurisdictions of Malta and Liechtenstein were 
the next to follow with DLT/Blockchain regulations. In a 
purposive sampling approach [26], a total of twenty indi-
viduals from the three jurisdictions (Gibraltar, Liechten-
stein, and Malta) representing primary stakeholders such 
as regulators, government officials, legal advisors, lobby-
ists, FinTech firms, developers, and licensees, were iden-
tified and interviewed in person. 
Data Collection. The two main sources of data col-
lection were the regulatory documents and the in-person 
interviews. Interviews were conducted either in person or 
via an industry-grade and encrypted videoconferencing 
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tool (Zoom, version 4.1.34801.1116) between late fall 
of 2018 and spring of 2019. The interviews lasted be-
tween 41 and 99 minutes with an average of 62 minutes 
and a median of 69 minutes. The interviews were rec-
orded, transcribed, and coded for analysis. Furthermore, 
interviewers took notes during the interviews. Besides 
the legal documents other documents such as press in-
terviews were collected, reviewed, and coded as appro-
priate.  
Data Analysis and Coding. The codebook followed 
the questionnaire regarding the breakdown of (1) main 
questions and sub-questions (2) perceptions of and mo-
tivations for DLT provider/provision regulation, (3) 
state of legislative and regulatory process, and (4) chal-
lenges and outlook within the broader context of DLT 
provider/provision regulation producing initially 15 cat-
egory codes and 30 sub-category codes. Additional 
codes were inductively introduced during data collec-
tion, in individual coding sessions, and inter-coder ses-
sions [27, 30, 32]. Since a codebook in a hybrid ap-
proach of deductive and inductive analyses [10] is de-
signed to be open to extension, it ultimately encom-
passed 57 sub-category codes in the four main catego-
ries. Whenever evidence from the data supported it, re-
lationship links between concepts were established, 
which were not interpreted as causal links. 
5. Findings 
5.1 Ad research question #1 (How do the inves-
tigated regulatory approaches compare?): 
 Gibraltar, while still a part of the European Union 
(EU) before the United Kingdom’s leaving the EU 
(Brexit), was the first jurisdiction to regulate the provi-
sion of DLT-based services. The respective law went 
into force on January 1, 2018 as Financial Services (Dis-
tributed Ledger Technology Providers) Regulations 
2017, legal notice No. 204. The legislation amended pre-
vious financial-sector regulations such as the Principal 
Act as well as the Financial Services (Licensing) Regu-
lations of 1991, the Financial Services (Penalty Fees) 
Regulations of 1993, and Financial Services (Fees) Reg-
ulations of 2016. The DLT Provider Regulation of 2017 
defined DLT-based services as a “way of business” that 
uses “distributed ledger technology for storing and 
transmitting value belongings to others” (p. 2481). It 
further defines DLT as “a database system in which (a) 
information is recorded and consensually shared and 
synchronized across a network of multiple nodes; and 
(b) all copies of the database are regarded as equally au-
thentic” (p. 2481). Additionally, “value” is defined as to 
include “assets, holdings and other forms of ownership, 
rights or interests, with or without related information, 
such as agreements or transactions for the transfer of 
value or its payment, clearing or settlement” (p. 2481). 
The Gibraltar regulation, hence, provides a vast umbrella 
definition of value stored and transferred via DLT, which 
can contain anything from securities over commodities to 
ownership rights of physical objects such as pieces of art, 
which would normally not fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission (GFSC). 
The Gibraltar DLT Provider Regulation is unique in that 
it refrained from addressing information technology in 
any specific terms other than the most general and neu-
tral. It is also unique in its desistance from specifying any 
hard rules, with which DLT licensees have to comply. It 
rather lists nine principles, which include (1) honesty and 
integrity of business conduct, (2) due regard to customer 
needs and fair communications, (3) adequacy of re-
sources, (4) effective management and control, also with 
regard to risk, (5) effective protective arrangements, (6) 
effective governance arrangements, (7) system security, 
(8) systems of detection and prevention of crime, and (9) 
provisions for orderly wind down of business. 
While the regulation leaves room for non-financial 
uses of DLT service provision, its regulatory home was 
seen under the roof of the GFSC, which vets DLT pro-
vider applications and grants DLT provider licenses. The 
GSFC has sweeping powers in licensing, monitoring, and 
enforcing compliance with DLT-based and traditional fi-
nancial services. GFSC also enjoys flexibility and a wide 
range of interpretative space for assessing and evaluating 
the soundness and viability of the business of any given 
DLT provider licensee. Throughout the first year of the 
regulation in force (2018) a total of four licenses were 
granted, the businesses of three of which were in opera-
tion in the crypto exchange market arena, and another 
dozen licenses were close to being granted in the first half 
of 2019. 
Interestingly, despite, or, rather because of the wide 
definition of DLT-based service provision, Gibraltar leg-
islators felt compelled to formulate a proposal for a “To-
ken Regulation,” which compensates for the existing lack 
of token-specific regulation (see Gibraltar Finance, 
http://gibraltarfinance.gi/20180309-token-regulation---
policy-document-v2.1-final.pdf, accessed September 21, 
2018). The respective regulation was expected to pass the 
Gibraltar Parliament in the fall of 2018; however, it has 
since been stuck in the process. 
Liechtenstein, a European Area (EA), that is, EU-as-
sociated country, had entered (by early June 2019—the 
time of this writing) the stages of parliamentary proceed-
ings for a comprehensive and detailed regulation of ser-
vices forming a “token economy” built upon so-called 
“trustworthy technologies” [13]. The interviewees ex-
pected that the respective comprehensive regulation 
would be passed and in force by January of 2020. While 
other jurisdictions more narrowly focus their regulations 
and proposals for regulation on the area of financial 
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services and also in some cases touch on technology-
specific aspects of the phenomenon, the Liechtenstein 
regulation is deliberately broad and technology neutral. 
While it considers unique characteristics of Blockchain 
technology as examples, the proposed legislation refers 
to digital services based on “trustworthy technologies,” 
which extend far beyond financial assets such as curren-
cies and securities into values including utility coins, 
commodities, raw materials, real estate, other physical 
objects (in general), patents, copyrights, machinery, and 
entitlements, among others. In the Liechtenstein regula-
tory perspective, the tokenization of these items of value 
and ownership provides for the evolution of the so-
called “token economy.” For this to materialize, the cre-
ation of tokens, which are seen as initially empty “con-
tainers,” in and through which whatever tangible or in-
tangible value can be represented, has to be regulated 
along with the safe storage and maintenance of such to-
kens. Furthermore, the regulation has to encompass se-
cure trading and exchange of tokens including public to-
ken offerings, general related services, and private in-
vestments. 
The broad scope of Liechtenstein’s regulation cre-
ates numerous points of connection and intersections 
with other laws and regulations, which as a consequence 
are in need of amendments such as the Due Diligence 
Act (anti-money laundering/AML and combating-fi-
nancing terrorists/CFT) and the Financial Market Su-
pervision Act, which basically gives the Financial Mar-
ket Authority (FMA) strong oversight over the regulated 
token economy as defined by the TVTG (TTTA, that is, 
Token and Trusted Technologies Service Provider Law). 
Furthermore, amendments had to be made to existing 
Civil and Corporate Law to include TVTG-related 
“value rights” as well as to the Commercial Law with 
regard to TTTA providers. Once in force, the Liechten-
stein regulation of DLT/Blockchain/Tokens would be 
the most comprehensive of its kind so far. 
Malta, a EU member state, has a history of success-
fully attracting business opportunities like Gibraltar, 
which for the lack of conducive and accommodating 
legislation have difficulties to develop their full poten-
tial elsewhere. Both Malta and Gibraltar competed in de-
veloping such legal environments for the unfolding 
online gaming businesses as early as the late 1980s. In 
both cases, major global players in that particular busi-
ness segment were attracted to making their operations 
home in these regulated environments leading to major 
increases of wealth and tax revenue as well as high-tech-
nology know-how influx in the two jurisdictions. With 
the appearance of cryptocurrencies, businesses and law-
makers in both jurisdictions understood early that a sim-
ilar opportunity was likely at hand. The approach, which 
Malta has taken, however, is different from the two 
aforementioned ones. With much fanfare (“Malta, the 
Blockchain Island”) three pieces of legislation went into 
force in November of 2018. The first, the Virtual Finan-
cial Assets Act (VFAA) regulates “the field of Initial Vir-
tual Financial Assets Offerings and Virtual Financial As-
sets” and related services and matters. It defines a DLT 
asset as a virtual token, a virtual financial asset, electronic 
money, or a financial instrument (VFAA, cap. 590, p. 3). 
In nine major sections and a total of 62 paragraphs VFFA 
provides detailed regulations regarding requirements for 
licensing, application procedures, administration and ob-
ligation of license holders, prevention of abuses, regula-
tory and investigatory powers, auditing, appeals, sanc-
tions etc., among others. The VFA Act also introduces the 
institution of a registered “VFA agent” (VFAA, cap. 590, 
p. 6), typically a lawyer, accountant, or auditor (firm) 
through whom and which VFA offerings can be licensed. 
The VFA Act is accompanied by the Malta Digital Inno-
vation Authority Act (MDIAA), cap 590, and Innovative 
Technology Arrangements and Services Act (ITAS), cap 
592. While the former act introduces a new supervisory 
and advisory authority, the Malta Digital Innovation Au-
thority (MDIA), geared at guiding and supervising the 
implementation and uses of novel technologies, the latter 
is designed for regulating such novel technologies as need 
emerges. DLT Service-related licenses have to clear sev-
eral hurdles in Malta before they are granted. The tech-
nology arrangements need to certified by MDIA under 
ITAS, whereas the financial business-related arrange-
ments undergo a review and approval by certified VFA 
agents, the license of operation for which is then ulti-
mately granted by the Malta Financial Services Author-
ity. As it appears, the technology certification and the (fi-
nancial) business certification involve and follow two 
separate, but ideally parallel, processes. The MDIA Act 
states that an “array of other national competent authori-
ties” might have a say in the certification processes. It will 
remain to be seen how effective and time-efficient the 
two-pronged certification process works. 
In summary, the three regulatory approaches employ 
fairly distinct regimes and processes. While Gibraltar was 
the first to provide a regulatory framework, it purpose-
fully remained vague and unspecific about technology 
and token-related matters, whereas Malta not only imple-
mented a new technology-focused agency, but also in-
volved another intermediary, the VFA agent, into a two-
pronged certification procedure. Liechtenstein, on the 
other hand, envisioned and tried to foster the emergence 
of a whole-new token economy with a comprehensive, 
however, clear approach that appears to be well integrated 
into existing legal frameworks beyond the financial 
frameworks. 
5.2 Ad research question #2 (What are motivations 
and challenges for regulating DLT providers/provision at 
an early stage?): 
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As will be shown in the following, the motivations 
for regulating DLT/Blockchain/Token service providers 
as well as the perceived challenges of such regulations 
were seen in similar, if not the same ways across the 
three jurisdictions, which is why they are presented be-
low forgoing the breakdown used in the previous section 
to avoid unnecessary repetition. 
 In 2017, the year before the regulation in Gibraltar 
and Malta went into force, about $6.6b had been raised 
in the eleven largest cryptoasset offerings alone in a 
global ICO marketplace without much of a legal protec-
tion or regulation [18]. Without exception the value of 
these crypto holdings had all fallen significantly until 
the end of that same year, in some cases by up to 98 per-
cent. Besides the inherent riskiness and volatility of 
these particular kinds of investments, however, over 80 
percent of cryptoasset projects in terms of number of 
shares were identified as scams [8]. It was feared by both 
FinTech stakeholders and regulators in the three juris-
dictions (Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, and Malta) that the 
very high burn rate observed in ICOs and purposefully 
abusive uses in permissionless environments could ef-
fectively suffocate a novel and highly attractive business 
opportunity before it had even fully developed. Regula-
tion, hence, was considered an urgent necessity to pre-
vent that from happening. An equally strong motivation 
on part of major stakeholders in the three jurisdictions in 
favor of DLT/Blockchain/Token regulation was the de-
sire to move fast and decisively for seizing what was 
considered a unique and rapidly emerging business op-
portunity before larger jurisdictions would be able to put 
their own respective stakes in the ground. Bolstered and 
enabled by their relatively small sizes, manageable num-
ber of stakeholders, and arm-length decision-making 
processes the three jurisdictions enjoy high degrees of 
agility and flexibility that make such early and fast leg-
islative moves possible. This, in turn, was expected to 
attract serious and reputable businesses in the evolving 
FinTech sector and adjacent service areas by establish-
ing legal certainty along with secure and safe opera-
tional settings for cryptoasset exchanges and other DLT-
based service provisions. Explains a Gibraltar govern-
ment official,  
“If there is no framework, and there is no control, 
and there is no transparency, it is going to crash 
and burn. So, we have taken the view, let us allow 
it, but control it, regulate it, and ensure that every-
body is involved in it and knows what they are do-
ing... By regulating we brought the good ones in 
and kept the bad ones out. They have got to go 
through the Financial Services Commission, pay 
fees, invest in the place by putting people here and 
by putting offices here. And that is going to push 
away the bulk of people that we do not want here.” 
(quote #01) 
However, other motivations also included the pro-
spect of and potential for reforming the financial and 
other service arenas via groundbreaking innovations 
with the hope of making markets more equitably ac-
cessible. As a Liechtenstein regulator holds, 
“One of the big visions...is to democratize finan-
cial services again. Now you have the financial 
services in the hands of a few powerful players. 
And in the future, every small- or medium-sized 
company can issue shares without going to the 
bank..., and that will help innovation.” (quote #02) 
In all three jurisdictions, another strong common mo-
tivation for effective regulatory action was the protection 
of their international reputation and “good standing” as a 
financial service hub and an internationally credible 
guardian against AML and CFT. Said a Malta legal advi-
sor to the government, 
“At the moment, this country unfortunately is sub-
ject to a lot of negative press relating to some 
abuse in relation to money laundering and financ-
ing services. So, if you want to start fixing the sit-
uation, you see that this technology can help solve 
that problem, then the faster you move, the better 
the opportunity is.” (quote #03) 
Finally, interviewees from all three jurisdictions 
acknowledged that in the future and in order to remain 
compliant, adjustments to the local regulations might be-
come necessary as soon as major jurisdictions such as the 
EU or the US establish their own legal DLT/Block-
chain/Token frameworks. In this regard, some interview-
ees saw the EU and some of their member states moving 
faster than the federal government of the United States 
and some federal states within the union. Liechtenstein 
interviewees, particularly, expressed some confidence 
about their approach to potentially become the role model 
for neighboring countries like Switzerland and Austria, 
but potentially for the European Area as a whole. 
In summary, while the regulatory approaches as 
shown above vary to quite some extent, the motivations 
of and the perceived challenges for regulating 
DLT/Blockchain/Token service providers were seen in 
very similar ways across the three jurisdictions. The abil-
ity to move fast due to small size and agility helped facil-
itate regulatory action geared at (1) preventing the abuse 
and consequential annihilation of a potentially grand eco-
nomic opportunity, (2) attracting and retaining serious 
and solid players to a regulated and safe business envi-
ronment, thus, capturing economic opportunity, (3) pro-
tecting the respective jurisdiction’s reputation, and (4) 
fostering fundamental innovations by creating a ”token 
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economy” with democratized access, and (5) serving as 
a poster child for regulatory approaches of others. 
5.3 Ad research question #3 (How are the identified 
challenges addressed in the various approaches of early 
regulations?): 
 Gibraltar had received a little under forty license 
applications until the end of 2018, five of which had 
been meticulously vetted and granted (Coinfloor, 
Covesting, GBX—Gibraltar Blockchain Exchange, Hu-
obi, and eToroX) by the Gibraltar Financial Services 
Commission (GFSC), and the first three of those listed 
had started regulated operations in the territory before 
the end of that year. These licensees appear to meet the 
criteria of business prowess and reliability. Since com-
mencing operations the five licensees mainly have fo-
cused on providing exchange platforms for the trading 
of cryptocurrencies. With the more specific token regu-
lation still pending, it is currently unclear how the first-
mover advantage will be fully captured and maintained. 
By the end of 2018, with a staff of under one hundred 
the GFSC had had dedicated a single digit number of 
staffers to reviewing applications and to monitoring li-
censed DLT provider businesses. Since licensed DLT 
provider services are expected to become increasingly 
diverse and require highly sophisticated subject-matter 
expertise for effective oversight on part of the regulator, 
the hiring of new expert staff appears a midterm neces-
sity. However, using the example of the gaming indus-
try, the Gibraltar interviewees were in agreement and 
fairly adamant that they were neither expecting and nor 
inviting hundreds of applications but ultimately rather 
more like dozens of solid DLT provider businesses op-
erating from the territory. The current license holders 
appeared to match these criteria also with regard to up-
holding Gibraltar’s good reputation. As one legal advi-
sor maintains, 
 “Reputation is always key in these areas because 
we want to be here for a long time. Not just short-
term venture where you make a lot of money and 
then disappear. That I think has been the aim of 
the regulator and the government as well. Cer-
tainly, we will feel comfortable with that too as 
lawyers, knowing that everybody is thinking 
alike, and we are looking for a similar kind of cli-
entele that fit certain criteria.” (quote #04). 
It remains to be seen though to what extent Gibraltar’s 
regulatory approach can serve as a role model for other 
jurisdictions, although elements such as the “nine princi-
ples” seem to resound in other legislative approaches (for 
example, Malta’s VFAA, cap 590, p. 12) at least in part. 
Liechtenstein, unlike the other two jurisdictions cov-
ered by this study, did not have DLT/Blockchain/Token 
legislation in force at the time. However, the proposed 
legislation appears to be well-integrated with existing 
law, and in particular, with financial service-related leg-
islation. In anticipation of the pending regulation and li-
censed on grounds of existing financial law, Binance, a 
major player in the global cryptocurrency arena, has 
launched a fiat-to-crypto exchange as a joint venture with 
Liechtenstein Cryptoassets Exchange (LCX). By the 
spring of 2019, The FMA had received over 250 license 
applications, a few of which launched operations in a 
sandbox-similar fashion under the auspices of the FMA. 
However, the high number of application also seems to 
indicate strong interest in the innovative potential of the 
broader token economy as envisioned and facilitated by 
the upcoming legislation and the guidance by the FMA. 
As a Government Official points out, 
“If you only look at the financial market regula-
tion applications, there was really no need to ac-
tively change something because if you tokenize 
a security, the security laws apply in Liechten-
stein. Also, the financial market law applies to that 
section. There is just the question about bitcoins 
and utility coins that is open at the moment. But 
we have seen there is a lot more potential in the 
rest of the token economy. And if you want to to-
kenize a physical asset, if you want to tokenize a 
car, a supply chain, and all the possible applica-
tions of the token in the industry besides the finan-
cial market. And that was the reason why we find 
a broader approach to regulate.” (quote #05) 
Once the legislation goes into force, it will be seen 
how effective it is, how well the supervision by the FMA 
works, and how it facilitates service innovation across a 
large range of areas far beyond the financial sector. While 
it appears wise to initially charter the FMA with the li-
censing task and the oversight, other supervisory entities 
might need to become involved as the token economy un-
folds. The Liechtenstein legislation shows some teeth 
also with regard to specifying criminal infractions of the 
regulation and respective punishments. 
Malta, for reasons of too permissive handling of DLT 
services already operating from its territory before the 
regulation, and in particular, for lax enforcement of AML 
and CFT measures, had come under serious pressure from 
both the United States and the European Commission 
[33]. As seen, the jurisdiction responded with establish-
ing fairly detailed and comprehensive legislation, which 
tried to strike a balance between stricter oversight and 
maintenance of the innovative space it intended to pro-
vide. Licensees have to go through two licensing author-
ities, which cover the technology and the business side of 
the application. The technology side is covered by MDIA, 
a brand-new authority. For the business side, certified 
agents had to be involved, which act as the subject matter 
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experts on behalf of the MFSA. By spring 2019, how-
ever, only about a dozen VFA agents had been certified, 
so that the applications from DLT/Blockchain/Token 
businesses already in operation in the country under a 
transitory regime since November 1, 2018 had still re-
mained in an unlicensed or preliminary status. From that 
end, the recent admonishment by the EC demanding 
stricter oversight (see above) is coherent. In part, this 
problem is also reflected in a lobbyist’s critical remark 
about the regulation, 
“Potentially, we over-regulated the whole thing, 
and the reasons there, even though I think the in-
tention was good, are many. One, the Malta Fi-
nancial Service Authority did not want to take any 
risks. You also need to factor in the international 
climate or international perception, which Malta 
managed to achieve in the past few years. We are 
mentioned in the Panama Papers, where we are 
seen as a tax haven etc. So, the MFSA had to build 
something new, and they set the bar too high. It is 
almost like having an initial public offering when 
it is not like that. So, that might have killed that 
industry per se.” (quote #06) 
It appears that the current regulatory situation has not 
yet effectively prevented abuses in the DLT provider 
market, nor has it helped repair Malta’s currently stricken 
reputation, although the ESMA Advice notice of January 
2019 [2] explicitly refers to Malta’s regulation as to ba-
sically heading into the right direction; however, at the 
same time the agency also points at the high failure rate 
in VFA agent certifications. 
In summary, the challenges of abuse prevention, busi-
ness development, reputation management, innovation, 
and role modeling in the rapidly evolving DLT/Block-
chain/Token space are addressed in different ways by the 
three jurisdictions. In the case of Gibraltar, based on a 
regulation with some interpretive wiggle room, a highly 
selective licensing regime is applied. Liechtenstein’s reg-
ulation appears to be the farthest reaching with the intent 
of creating an entirely new token economy, while Malta’s 
detailed and two-stage regulation appears to be influ-
enced as much by remedial efforts and damage control as 
by first-mover opportunity objectives. In that, the latter 
might lack in part the attractiveness of the other two reg-
ulation regimes from a business perspective. 
6. Discussion 
Risk, Opportunity, and Regulation. The US Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) along 
with European counterparts such as the three ESAs, that 
is, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and 
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Au-
thority (EIOPA) have been vocal and clear in their re-
peated warnings against the risks incurred when investing 
in cryptocurrencies and digital assets. That notwithstand-
ing the market capitalization of the leading 100 virtual 
currencies was estimated to have reached a volume of 
$281.3b (https://coinmarketcap.com — accessed June 14, 
2019). This volume cannot be explained just on grounds 
of dirty funds and dirty sources of funds in the AML and 
CFT sense. What this demonstrates, is that rather despite 
all warnings tremendous appetite for risk and for captur-
ing what is seen as a unique opportunity exists. As argued 
elsewhere [28], regulating an unfolding technology-facil-
itated global economic innovation in a non-stifling fash-
ion is by no means a trivial task, which, however, when 
done smartly can create tremendous public value along 
various lines. As seen in the findings to RQ#1 the early 
regulations in the DLT/Blockchain/Token provider space 
by the three small jurisdictions may come from a stand-
point of strong self-interest in the first place, but it is ra-
ther also reflective of the necessity to provide guidance as 
well as enforceable and safe pathways towards develop-
ing and entertaining novel business models and methods, 
which, in fact, helps create public value. 
From that perspective, it would be helpful if large ju-
risdictions such as the US and the EU also followed suit 
and moved more quickly with developing respective reg-
ulatory frameworks. Issuing warnings is neither sufficient 
nor good enough for a dynamic environment and clearly 
articulated business need as this one. 
Laws in Tension and Harmonization of Legislation. 
When regulating the DLT/Blockchain/Token provider 
space, existing laws might not only be in need of amend-
ments, but they might rather also be in tension with any 
given DLT/Blockchain/Token provider regulation. As 
mentioned above [24], a case in point may be the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which in-
troduces the principle of extraterritorial applicability, 
which increases the reach of this particular regulation 
globally. While one can argue that via built-in cryptog-
raphy the data and privacy rights of individuals are effec-
tively protected in a Blockchain for the most part, the 
technology itself powerfully and effectively defeats the 
GDPR “right to be forgotten,” once the cryptographic 
shield has legally or illegally been removed. Furthermore, 
due to the inherently global nature of distributed technol-
ogy ledgers, liabilities may be incurred under the laws of 
involved jurisdiction, which are unknown, or even un-
knowable, to both the regulated DLT service provider and 
the client. While it is illusory to hope that all such poten-
tial legal ambiguities and vagueries can ever be resolved 
in a global context, it also demonstrated that some extent 
of regulation harmonization might be conducive to 
providing firm legal foundations for operating safely in 
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the DLT/Blockchain/Token provider space as the find-
ings from RQ#2 suggest. 
Smart Contracts. As shown in part in the findings to 
RQ#3, one of the most attractive, since dynamic, fea-
tures of the token economy is the use of smart contracts. 
Elsewhere, the implications of “law becoming code” 
and “code becoming law” have been discussed [7]. 
When it comes to the regulation of DLT service provid-
ers, this particular aspect can be addressed in various 
ways (for example, in Gibraltar and Malta, the principle 
of fair and honest business conduct covers the issue in 
an umbrella type of fashion). However, once it comes to 
regulation enforcement and practical oversight, smart 
contracts, and in particular, intelligent smart contracts, 
which can change upon dynamically changing condi-
tions, is not a trivial undertaking. Even if unlawful be-
havior in this context is finally detected, remedial action 
might no longer be possible. Vetting the algorithmic 
soundness by technically versed lawyers, which are cur-
rently hard to get by, might be a necessary requirement 
at the outset. However, smart contracts, which entail and 
use artificial intelligence (AI)-based algorithms might 
be hard to evaluate both ex-ante and ex-post. In other 
words, despite effective and widely harmonized regula-
tions, some areas remain to be better understood in their 
ultimate consequences. 
7. Conclusion 
This study’s object was to contribute to the deeper 
understanding of DLT/Blockchain/Token service pro-
vider regulation and its potential effects. However, our 
interest was not derived from a national or international 
law perspective. We were rather interested in assessing 
and evaluating three early regulatory approaches and un-
derstand the motivations behind these approaches, as 
well as the challenges anticipated, and the expectations 
held in these approaches. In general, this paper contrib-
utes to the knowledge of obstacles confronting innova-
tive and potentially disruptive information technologies 
and novel services built upon these. In particular, this 
paper compares the motivations, challenges, and expec-
tation of three small first-and-fast-mover jurisdictions. 
The forerunner efforts of these three jurisdictions may 
serve as role models and sounding boards for larger ju-
risdictions such as the EU and the US in their own reg-
ulatory aspirations on the subject matter. However, it ap-
pears as evident that harmonized regulation, at least to 
some degree, across major jurisdictions would help the 
token economy, as Liechtenstein phrased it, succeed 
more swiftly and more safely. 
Future research will expand the comparative study 
by a number of other jurisdictions including Bermuda, 
France, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland among 
others. In a couple of years, it is planned to revisit the 
three early mover jurisdictions and assess the landscape 
of DLT/Blockchain/Token service providers and the ef-
fectiveness of the regulation comparing the perspectives 
of the various stakeholders on it. 
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